Essays On Contract Design And Incentive Provision
About The Part I consists of three chapters that study contract-theoretic models which are motivated by the classic procurement problem of a principal who wants an agent to deliver a certain good or service. While empirical research is very difficult in contract theory, laboratory experiments have recently turned out to be an important source of data. This thesis is divided into two parts
Contract theory, which emphasizes the importance of unverifiable actions and private information, has been a highly active field of research in microeconomics in the last decades. In such models it is typically assumed that decision makers are interested in their own monetary payoffs only. This thesis is divided into two parts. Yet, in practice people often do not behave this way. In Part II, three experimental studies are presented that investigate contract-theoretic problems brought up in Part I. Moreover, they have unlimited cognitive abilities and behave in a perfectly rational way. Part I consists of three chapters that study contract-theoretic models which are motivated by the classic procurement problem of a principal who wants an agent to deliver a certain good or service. While empirical research is very difficult in contract theory, laboratory experiments have recently turned out to be an important source of data.
Books > Business and Management
Essays On Contract Design And Incentive Provision
Books > Business and Management
Specifications of Essays On Contract Design And Incentive Provision | |
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| Category | Medien > Bücher |
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