Economics Of Income Redistribution

The book begins by showing how contractarian ideals can be used to justify choices about decision-making.The Calculus of Consent and Constitutional Design bridges the gap between normative questions about which institutions are most efficient and fair and empirical questions about how constitutions are formed. This provides a backdrop for analyzing the three phases of constitutional decision-making: 1) the constitutional phase, where rules for constitutional decision making must be justified; 2) the legislative phase, where the optimal k-majority rule is analyzed; and 3) the electoral phase, where the optimal voting rule for large electorates and open alternatives are determined.

This is why we end up with common beliefs about these constitutions: they are above our heads, around us. This is particularly true with constitutions.

A Natural Experiment on Electoral Law Reform.

A second, associated largely with political science, has a primarily empirical focus, and looks in depth at how electoral rules impact on political outcomes, through large cross-sectional or case studies.

This volume employs the third approach to report on experiments that look at alternatives to the present two round (majority runoff) system used for the election of French presidents.